This article is the first in a series on Chinese strategy and development efforts around the semiconductor industry.

Between 2013 and 2014, official Chinese documents began to link the domestic semiconductor industry directly with issues of national security. This development coincided with a major redefinition of national security under top leader Xi Jinping, which gained expression in his April 2014 announcement of the “Overall National Security Concept” (总体国家安全观). The new Concept represented a broadened view of national security that included “science and technology security” and “information security,” among other domains. Over the same period, official documents reflected an altered assessment of China’s “period of strategic opportunity” (战略机遇期) as it related to the semiconductor industry. These assessments coincided with the 2014 Outline for Promoting and Developing the National Integrated Circuit Industry (“the 2014 Outline”), which marked a new phase of unprecedented state support for the domestic semiconductor industry.  

2011–12: Strategic Industries for Economic Competitiveness

The major semiconductor policy statements of 2011–12 describe the semiconductor industry as underpinning the technological transformation of the economy and society. In this era, policy documents that identify the semiconductor industry as “strategic,” however, do not emphasize the national security importance of the industry as a matter of priority. For example, the State Council’s 2011 Several Policies to Further Stimulate the Development of the Software and Integrated Circuit Industries《进一步鼓励软件产业和集成电路产业发展若干政策》opens with the following: 

“The software and integrated circuit industries are National Strategic Emerging Industries; they are an important foundation for the people’s economy and social informatization.” 软件产业和集成电路产业是国家战略性新兴产业，是国民经济和社会信息化重要基础。

Likewise, the 12th Five-Year Plan National Strategic Emerging Industries Development Plan 《十二五”国家战略性新兴产业发展规划》, issued in July 2012, describes semiconductors and other rising frontier technologies as important primarily because they underlie development and international economic competitiveness.

2013–14: Foundations for Safeguarding National Security

Starting in 2013, officials started directly linking the semiconductor industry with issues of national security. A Sept. 6 People’s Daily piece reporting on comments by then-Vice Premier Ma Kai 马凯 specifically links semiconductors to “national information security,” which it says must be protected by requiring China’s technology to be “advanced, secure and controllable, and independent and reliable.” This judgement also appeared in the 2014 Outline, as well as a People’s Daily article that accompanied its announcement. The 2014 Outline’s introduction extends the themes of 2011–12, but also incorporates national security into its assessment of the semiconductor industry’s political importance: 

“The integrated circuit industry comprises the core of the information technology industry; it is a strategic, fundamental, and guiding industry that supports economic and social development and safeguards national security.” 集成电路产业是信息技术产业的核心，是支撑经济社会发展和保障国家安全的战略性、基础性和先导性产业。

The July 2014 People’s Daily piece specifies that, so far, China’s semiconductor industry is not sufficiently strong to support “national information security” or “national defense security.” Taken together, this consistent link between semiconductors and national security in authoritative official statements in 2013–14 fits with Xi Jinping’s broader redefinition of national security under the Overall National Security Concept. 

A Closing Window of Strategic Opportunity

As the semiconductor industry was increasingly associated with national security in official documents, the Communist Party publicly identified a shift in its perceived strategic landscape. As the November 2021 resolution on CCP history illustrates, the Party places great importance on historical periodization as a rubric for formulating coherent policies. Former General Secretary Jiang Zemin’s report to the 16th Party Congress in 2002 identified the first two decades of the new millennium (2000–20) as a “period of strategic opportunity” (战略机遇期), in which conditions would be most favorable for China to advance its interests. In the case of the semiconductor industry, the years 2013–14 marked an inflection point at which the Party began to assert that historical conditions may soon alter or narrow this window of opportunity. 

The global financial crisis of 2008 was a vital turning point for the Party’s theoretical judgments. To many, it signaled U.S. decline, and the economic re-ordering that followed created conditions ripe for a technological revolution that could prove favorable to China’s interests. As Premier Wen Jiabao wrote in the Party’s leading theoretical journal Qiushi 求是 in July 2011: 

“For China, this [the global rise of innovation and new industries] is both a great challenge and  a rare opportunity. Historical experience illustrates that economic crises are often the catalyst for new scientific and technological revolutions and industrial revolutions.”  对我国来说，这既是重大的挑战，也是难得的机遇。历史经验表明，经济危机往往是新科技革命和产业革命的催化剂。

This analysis of the global strategic context informed the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015), which focused on economic transformation through innovation in science and technology. The post-12th Five-Year Plan Strategic Emerging Industries Development Plan, issued in July 2012, judged that multi-polarity and continued economic globalization offered an environment conducive to China developing its semiconductor industry and other “strategic emerging industries.” Given China’s role as a follower in many of these advanced industries, this strategic opening was seen as important, especially for Chinese industry “going out” (走出去) into the world, international R&D collaboration, and M&A.

However, the September 2013 People’s Daily piece on Ma Kai’s remarks signalled the beginning of a change in the Party’s portrayal of the international context. Ma reportedly stated that the semiconductor industry had arrived at a “critical period” (关键时期) in which opportunities remained, but risks and challenges were numerous. The 2014 Outline and the accompanying People’s Daily piece together offer a more clearly specified view of the connection between time and opportunity. The 2014 Outline’s introductory section states: 

“for the development of China’s integrated circuit industry, the present time and a period into the future is an important period of strategic opportunity as well as an [important] period to tackle key problems.” 当前和今后一段时期是我国集成电路产业发展的重要战略机遇期和攻坚期

The accompanying People’s Daily piece to the 2014 Outline reiterates that China’s semiconductor industry faces a “period of strategic opportunity,” but closes with the assessment that this “may already be [the industry’s] last window of opportunity” (窗口期). Both of these statements make implicit or explicit reference to a potential narrowing of China’s freedom of action in the semiconductor industry. The sense that strategic foreclosure was looming appears to have motivated decisive action to seize the strategic opening while it still existed, reflected in Ma’s advocacy for “leapfrog development” (跨越式发展), the enormous mobilization of the 2014 Outline, and, ultimately, the combination of confidence and anxiety apparent in the Made in China 2025 policy issued in 2015. 

The sense of urgency regarding semiconductor development as portrayed in state media came against the backdrop of the Xi era's broader shift in national security narratives. Announcing the Overall National Security Concept in April 2014, Xi warned of the need to “strengthen our awareness of unexpected developments, and be vigilant in times of peace” (增强忧患意识，做到居安思危). The Chinese government's subsequent policy efforts to improve domestic semiconductor capabilities have their roots in this major realignment toward viewing chips not only as crucial to competitiveness but also to national security.