Introduction

Last summer the Chinese government released its ambitious New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (AIDP), which set the eye-catching target of national leadership in a variety of AI fields by 2030. The plan matters not only because of what it says about China’s technological ambitions, but also for its plans to shape AI governance and policy. Part of the plan’s approach is to devote considerable effort to standards-setting processes in AI-driven sectors. This means writing guidelines not only for key technologies and interoperability, but also for the ethical and security issues that arise across an AI-enabled ecosystem, from algorithmic transparency to liability, bias, and privacy.

This year Chinese organizations took a major step toward putting these aspirations into action by releasing an in-depth white paper on AI standards in January and hosting a major international AI standards meeting in Beijing in April. These developments mark Beijing’s first stake in the ground as a leader in developing AI policy and in working with international bodies, even as many governments and companies around the world grapple with uncharted territory in writing the rules on AI. China is eager to participate in international standards-setting bodies on the question of whether and how to set standards around controversial aspects of AI, such as algorithmic bias and transparency in algorithmic decision making.

At minimum, these efforts will significantly shape AI fields within China, where development and deployment of AI is at the center of wide-ranging public- and private-sector efforts. But standards setting globally is just getting started for AI, and there is no consensus on what aspects of AI require a standards-based approach.

Taking on the challenge of developing AI standards is the new SC 42 (Subcommittee 42), which sits under Joint Technical Committee 1 (JTC 1), in turn constituted by two widely respected standards bodies, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). (Its full ISO abbreviated name is thus ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42.) Established in October 2017, SC 42 includes participants from many countries and was the host for the April meeting in Beijing.

Realizing that China’s many large companies are increasingly global players, and Chinese-developed AI algorithms will have effects on users outside of China, China’s government aims to advance global efforts to set standards around ethical and social issues related to AI algorithm deployment. Should Chinese officials and experts succeed in influencing such standards and related AI governance discussions, the policy landscape may skew toward the interests of government-driven technical organizations, attenuating the voices of independent civil society actors that inform the debate in North America and Europe.

What standards mean in China and why Beijing cares about helping write international standards on AI

Over the past two years, the Chinese government has cranked out dozens of information and communications technology (ICT) standards, particularly in cybersecurity and digital economy domains. The government uses standards both as national policy tools and as potentially international protocols or guidelines for design and interoperability.

Domestic policy–oriented standards act more like a form of regulation, spelling out requirements that companies can be audited against even if they are not formally binding. They often flesh out the details of higher-level laws. Internationally, meanwhile, the government has stressed the importance of China playing a leadership role in writing global standards, both for economic reasons and because of the national prestige associated with having what is referred to as a “right to speak” and a seat at the table in global forums. Both drives are alive in January’s white paper, which is discussed in greater depth below.

Drivers for Chinese government standardization efforts

In particular, the Chinese government views standards as playing a significant role in the country’s aspirations for AI leadership. There are a number of different drivers behind this push.

First, the government hopes that its role in standardization will generate more value out of AI technologies by facilitating data pooling and improving the interoperability of systems. The importance of standards in spurring economic development, particularly for ICTs, is pervasive in Chinese policy and industry circles. According to a popular saying, “First-tier companies make standards, second-tier companies make technology, and third-tier companies make products (一流的企业做标准，二流的企业做技术，三流的企业做产品).”  

Second, setting standards may strengthen the commercial competitiveness of Chinese companies globally. This is because technical standards included as part of a technology stack, such as for 5G next generation mobile, include essential patents, and companies that contribute intellectual property to the overall system receive royalties when other companies build equipment using their patents. One of the AIDP’s near-term goals, targeting 2020, states: “The AI industry’s competitiveness should have entered the first echelon internationally. China should have established initial AI technology standards, service systems, and industrial ecological system chains. It should have cultivated a number of the world’s leading AI backbone enterprises.” The AIDP was thus in part a standards-centered policy: The Chinese word for standards (标准) appears 24 times in the AIDP; by comparison, the Chinese word for policy (政策) appears 26 times. Noting that the United States, the European Union, and Japan have all put forward policies related to AI standardization, the authors of the white paper view standardization as a crucial element in “seizing a new round of technology dominance” and ensuring the competitiveness of Chinese AI products and services in the international market.

Yet China’s prioritization of technical standards in AI policy is not solely motivated by economic gains. Developing standards that improve the quality of AI products and services may also reduce the risk of societal backlash to technology. Similarly, specifying methods for testing and assessing facial recognition systems or service robots to prevent high-profile accidents could cultivate societal trust in these new technologies. Ensuring that the advancement of AI does not disrupt societal stability is also a goal of the AIDP, which acknowledges that the government will have to deal with the social aftershocks of AI development, deepening income inequality and urban-rural disparities. Lastly, as an official Chinese readout of the SC 42 meeting in Beijing indicates, Chinese authorities view standardization efforts as a way to take a leading role in international governance on the safety and ethics of AI.

Finally, the drive to shape international standards (part of the “right to speak”) reflects long-standing concerns that Chinese representatives were not at the table to help set the rules of the game for the global Internet. The Chinese government wants to make sure that this does not happen in other ICT spheres, now that China has become a technology power with a sizeable market and leading technology companies, including in AI.

Assembling an AI standards effort

A number of different organizations within the bureaucracy have a role in the standards-setting process. The main player in ICT-related standards is the China Electronic Standardization Institute (CESI), which sits under the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). CESI led the effort to corral over two dozen companies, associations, and academic organizations who contributed to the AI white paper (see table below), helping solidify its role as a synthesizer across the interagency on AI standards.